One enduring principle of rational inference is category inclusion: Categories inherit the properties of their superordinates. In five experiments, I show that people do not consistently apply this principle when evaluating categorical arguments involving natural categories and a single nonexplainable predicate such as all electronic equipment has parts made of germanium, therefore all stereos have parts made of germanium. Participants frequently did not apply the category inclusion rule despite affirming the relevant categorical relation (e.g., stereos are electronic equipment). They failed to apply the rule even when categories were universally quantified unambiguously. Instead, judgments tended to be proportional to the similarity between premise and conclusion categories. Neglect of category inclusion relations was observed using arguments concerning natural kinds, artifacts, and social kinds. 1998 Academic Press Few assumptions about cognitive processing seem safer than that people allow categories to inherit properties from their superordinates. Knowing that all metals have some property seems more than enough reason to take for granted that iron has that property. The assumption is central to many semantic memory models in the form of inheritance hierarchies (e.g.,
nates' properties unless the category-property pairing is explicitly marked as exceptional.
Logically speaking, this category inclusion principle is more a requirement than an assumption. A superordinate category is a collection of instances. The claim that a superordinate has some property is, therefore, equivalent to the claim that each instance of the category has the property. If all animals have DNA, then any particular animal has DNA. In this explicit form, the logical legitimacy of category inclusion for projecting properties amongst categories seems self-evident and uncontroversial. However, its psychological validity is not. My purpose in this paper is to show that the category inclusion principle has only limited descriptive validity.
One reason to wonder about people's sensitivity to inclusion relations is the evidence that children have trouble understanding class inclusion (e.g., Inhelder & Piaget, 1964; see Markman, 1989 , for a review). For example, Markman, Horton, & McLanahan (1980) taught children and young teenagers a novel class-inclusion hierarchy using drawings of novel objects that were referred to by nonsense syllables. Category labels were taught both at the lower level of the hierarchy and at the higher, more inclusive, level. The learning procedure was analogous to showing a child pictures of pine trees and saying ''These are pines'', pictures of oak trees and saying ''These are oaks'', and pictures of both the pines and oaks and saying ''These are trees.'' Following learning, the experimenters queried the participants' understanding of the novel subordinate-superordinate relation by asking them whether the nonsense terms applied to a particular instance. This was analogous to pointing to an oak tree and asking ''Is this an oak?'' and ''Is this a tree?'' Whereas few errors were made at the lower level, indicating that participants almost always understood that the instance was a member of the subordinate name category, they made many errors at the higher level, indicating that they failed to understand that the instance also belonged to the superordinate.
The results were replicated using a behavioral measure revealing that the class-inclusion hierarchy was often understand as a part-whole hierarchy. When asked to point to an instance of the superordinate, the children-and even the teenagers to some extent-tended to point to several instances, suggesting that they understood the superordinate term as referring to a collection of instances; i.e., that the superordinate was a whole and the instances were its parts. The tendency to treat superordinate terms as referring to collections rather than classes extends even to adults. Murphy and Wisniewski (1989) found that adults were quicker to identify objects at the superordinate level when the objects were presented in groups rather than in isolation. Markman (1989) reviews an abundance of evidence that children reason more effectively with collections than with classes. This conclusion may also extend to adults. Indeed, adults are willing to violate class inclusion relations when assigning names. Hampton (1982) has shown intransitivities in the categorization of everyday objects. He found, for example, that people affirmed that ''A car headlight is a kind of a lamp'' and that ''A lamp is a kind of furniture'' but not ''A car headlight is a kind of furniture.'' Hampton also showed that not all of these cases can be attributed to polysemy or metaphor; people were referring to the same literal notion of lamp at each step. Apparently then, in such categorical statements, ''is a'' is not interpreted in terms of (extensional) class inclusion, for the logic of class inclusion prohibits such intransitivities. In Hampton's opinion, verification of statements of this type involves matching the features of subordinate to superordinate category prototypes. More generally, verification depends on the (intensional) similarity between the categories.
Like the results of many categorization experiments, Hampton's (1982) are ambiguous in that they could reflect either how people name objects or how they conceptualize them. People may employ a loose sense of inclusion when deciding what to call something, but may use a stricter sense when thinking about, for instance, what kinds of inferences a category affords. Reasoning about categories may elicit a sensitivity to the logic of category structure not evoked by naming, which is known to admit of fuzziness.
Studies of the strength of categorical arguments provide reason to believe that strict inclusion relations can be neglected in favor of similarity relations even in inference. The studies use arguments consisting of a premise-understood to be true-followed by a conclusion whose truth is unknown (Rips, 1975) . Each statement applies a single blank predicate (like has sesamoid bones) to a category (like robins). Predicates are blank if they elicit so few of participants' prior beliefs that they cannot reason about them . The idea is to examine how belief is transferred among categories by minimizing the contribution of the predicates. Sloman and Wisniewski (1992) show that the critical feature of a blank predicate is that a statement employing it be hard to explain. If a plausible explanation for a category's association with a predicate can be generated, then that explanation itself takes part in the reasoning process (Sloman, 1994; 1997) ; if it cannot, people are left to reason only about the relation between categories. Therefore, all ostriches have sesamoid bones.
Most people find Argument (A) stronger (more convincing) than Argument (B) Shafir, Smith, and Osherson, 1990) . All accounts 1 Predicates expressed in natural language are never devoid of meaning. The roles that blank predicates might play in the reasoning process is discussed in Sloman (1993) . so far ascribe this preference to the greater similarity Shafir, Smith, and Osherson, 1990) or extent of shared features (Sloman, 1993) between the premise and conclusion categories. Robins are typical birds and in that sense are similar to birds. Ostriches, in contrast, are atypical birds and robins are not judged similar to them. Therefore, robins transmit more belief to the conclusion about birds than ostriches. This reasoning is fallacious however because ostriches are birds so that any increase in likelihood enjoyed by the conclusion about all birds must be enjoyed in at least equal measure by the conclusion about ostriches. Therefore, this phenomenon is called the inclusion fallacy. It shows that people do not automatically apply categorical relations when making inferences in the form of arguments. Similarity can take priority. Sloman (1993) has demonstrated the neglect of inclusion relations more directly using arguments with blank predicates. Consider the following pair:
(C) All animals use norepinephrine as a neurotransmitter.
Therefore, all mammals use norepinephrine as a neurotransmitter. (D) All animals use norepinephrine as a neurotransmitter.
Therefore, all reptiles use norepinephrine as a neurotransmitter.
The category inclusion rule dictates that both arguments are perfectly strong. Mammals and reptiles are both animals so any predicate that applies to all animals should apply, in particular, to all mammals and reptiles. I asked University of Michigan students to rate the convincingness of these arguments on a scale from 1 (not at all convincing) to 10 (very convincing). The mean convincingness ratings were 7.5 and 6.0, respectively. Not only did the students not assign maximal convincingness ratings to these arguments (on average), but they gave higher ratings to the argument with the more similar categories. The strength of an argument in which the conclusion category is properly included in the premise category varies with the similarity of the two categories and therefore I call this preference the inclusion similarity phenomenon. The identical point is made by a second closely related phenomenon, premise specificity. To demonstrate inclusion similarity, I varied arguments' conclusion category. Here, I varied similarity by varying the specificity of the premise category. Consider the arguments: (E) All birds require trace amounts of magnesium for reproduction.
Therefore, all sparrows require trace amounts of magnesium for reproduction. (F) All animals require trace amounts of magnesium for reproduction.
Therefore, all sparrows require trace amounts of magnesium for reproduction.
Like inclusion similarity, I expected these arguments not to be given maximal convincingness ratings even though both premises imply the conclusion.
Argument (E) is composed using categories (birds and sparrows) that share more features than those in Argument (F) (animals and sparrows) and therefore I expected (F) to be rated lower than (E). As expected, the mean convincingness rating for (E) was 9.1, greater than the mean for (F) of 8.1. The current experiments have a primary goal and two secondary ones. The primary goal is to demonstrate the robustness of the inclusion similarity and premise specificity phenomena and to eliminate explanations that do not attribute them to neglect of class inclusion relations. These phenomena were only a minor concern in Sloman (1993) . As a result, I used only three pairs of arguments to demonstrate inclusion similarity and two to demonstrate premise specificity. Hence, the effects need to be replicated using a larger argument set. Experiment 1 below replicates the effects with a choice task that employs a total of 18 pairs of arguments. Experiments 2, 3, and 5 replicate the effect using a conditional probability judgment task (how probable is each conclusion, given its corresponding premise?).
A possible explanation for Sloman's (1993) results is that effects occurred only when participants did not ascribe an inclusion relation to premise and conclusion categories. For instance, they may not have considered sparrows to be animals when evaluating Argument (F). To challenge this explanation, Experiments 2, 3, and 5 test for the phenomena conditioning on participants' affirmation of the relevant inclusion relations. Also, the phenomena demonstrate fallacious reasoning only if participants understand that the predicate applies universally in the premise; i.e., to all category members. In Experiment 3, I look for the phenomena after securing that understanding. Experiments 3 and 4 try to eliminate the possibilities that the phenomena are a consequence of how people treat the probability response scale or their understanding of the notion of deductive validity.
A second goal of the paper is to explore the sensitivity of the phenomena to the salience of inclusion relations. If the phenomena are due to the neglect of inclusion relations, then they should vanish when inclusion relations are sufficiently accessible. Accessibility is manipulated in Experiments 4 and 5.
The final goal of the paper is to show the phenomena in different conceptual domains. Previous work on property projection has tended, like the arguments above, to use animal categories (though exceptions can be found in Shafir et al., 1990, and in Sloman, 1993) . Applicable psychological models of argument strength-the similarity-coverage model of Osherson et al. (1990) , the Gap model of Osherson, Smith, Meyers, Shafir, and Stob (1994) , and the feature-based induction model of Sloman (1993) -all assume general-purpose, domain-independent cognitive inference mechanisms. So a gap exists in the data; phenomena predicted by these models should be tested with arguments beyond the domain of animals.
Inference procedures may not be domain-independent (cf. Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994) . Reasoning might depend on domain-specific causal laws (Carey, 1985) . Gelman (1988) argues that animal kinds are treated as having more inductive potential than artifacts. Keil (1989) echoes this claim when he observes that ''there can be no real science of artifacts'' (p. 48). However, he also points out that artifacts may support some inductive inferences, namely those pertaining to their purpose and design, both of which are products of human intention. Knowledge that one kind of hammer is made from tempered steel provides evidence that another kind of hammer is also because, by virtue of its hardness, tempered steel could enable the function that hammers serve.
The occasional failure of artifacts to support inductive inferences may be a result of their heterogeneity (Gelman, 1988; Nisbett, Krantz, & Kunda, 1983) . Telephones come in many shapes and sizes and therefore these properties cannot be projected from one telephone to another. However, categories, including telephones, tend to be associated with both heterogeneous and homogeneous predicates. Hence, inductive potential, or projectibility, should not depend on category kind, but rather on the relation between a predicate and a category (Goodman, 1955; Markman, 1989; Nisbett, Krantz, & Kunda, 1983) . One possibility is that people assume that all categories have some inferential potential. This potential could emerge from the belief that all categories have an essence, an immutable core whose details are often unknown (Medin & Ortony, 1989) . If so, then the phenomena should arise even with artifact categories, as long as they are tested using homogeneous predicates.
To begin to explore the domain-general versus domain-specific views of the inferential process, I investigated the inclusion similarity and premise specificity phenomena using arguments that involved natural kinds as well as arguments involving artifacts and social kinds.
EXPERIMENT 1a
Experiment 1 was intended to show that similarity is a good predictor of argument strength even when category inclusion relations hold. People were asked to choose the stronger of two arguments in which the conclusion category was a proper subset of the premise category. Argument pairs from three domains had the structure of either the inclusion similarity or the premise specificity phenomenon. I predicted that people would choose the more similar argument in all three domains.
After testing participants, I became aware that not all participants were treating all predicates as blank. Experiment 1 therefore has two parts. In Experiment 1a, I collected the desired judgments. In Experiment 1b, I operationalized the notion of ''blank predicate'' and thus was able to evaluate which of the predicates appearing in the first part were actually blank. I was then able to evaluate the pattern of judgments for only those arguments involving blank predicates.
Method

Design and materials
Pairs of categorical arguments using blank predicates, much like those in the Appendix but without quantifiers, were constructed to test two phenomena. The inclusion similarity pairs consisted of two arguments with identical premises but different conclusion categories. Premise specificity arguments shared a conclusion and had different premises; the category of one premise including the category of the other. Three argument pairs appeared in each of three domains to test each phenomenon: natural kinds, artifacts, and social kinds. The natural kind categories were fruits, plants, bodies of water and metals. The artifacts were musical instruments, electronic equipment, tools, and utensils. The social kinds were composed of professions (e.g., artists, construction workers). Here's an example of a natural kind, inclusion similarity pair as subjects saw it: a. Metals are pentavalent.
b. Metals are pentavalent. Iron is pentavalent.
Platinum is pentavalent.
Each pair of arguments included one whose premise category and conclusion category were expected to be judged more similar than the other argument's premise and conclusion categories (e.g., metals and iron versus metals and platinum). The more similar pair was chosen to consist of a category and a typical subordinate and the less similar pair of a category and an atypical subordinate.
In sum, Experiment 1a varied Phenomenon (inclusion similarity and premise specificity) and Similarity (high versus low). It also varied Domain (natural kinds, artifacts, and social kinds). All participants received all levels of all variables. Each phenomenon was tested with only three arguments in each domain. This affords little power to test my prediction that no differences will be found across domains. As a result, inferential tests comparing domains will be omitted.
Subjects and Procedure
Seventy-three Brown University undergraduates were paid for their participation. Each participant filled out four questionnaires at their own pace in the following order: argument strength judgments, feature listings, similarity ratings, and typicality ratings. They were tested individually but in a group setting: Usually, other participants were filling out the questionnaires at their own pace in the same room. I describe each questionnaire in turn:
Argument strength. The 18 critical argument pairs (three each from three domains across two phenomena) were scattered among a total of 108 argument pairs. The other pairs were an assortment testing various phenomena (described in Sloman, 1993) . In none of the other arguments did the premise category include the conclusion category; this was true only of the critical pairs. Nor were any of the other arguments perfectly strong.
For each of the 108 pairs, participants were asked to choose which of the arguments was more convincing by circling it. They were given brief instructions concerning the meaning of ''convincing''; namely, that it involved the degree to which the premise-when assumed to be true-provided a reason for believing the conclusion. A brief example was provided and discussed.
The order of argument pairs from different domains and phenomena was randomized. The pairs were then divided into two groups. Approximately half of the participants evaluated one Note. Means are presented for all pairs (All arguments-Experiment 1a), and for all pairs in which predicates were also judged blank (Blank predicates only-judgments conditioned on data from Experiment 1b).
group first and the other second; the remaining participants chose arguments in the opposite order. For half of the pairs, the argument expected to be more similar was on the right, and for the other half it was on the left. Feature listings. This task was not relevant to the data reported here. Participants listed the features of 20 different categories.
Similarity ratings. Participants rated the similarity of the premise and conclusion categories from each of the 18 arguments (plus others) on a scale from 1 (not at all similar) to 7 (very similar).
Typicality ratings. Participants rated the typicality of the conclusion category with respect to the premise category for each of the 18 arguments on a scale from 1 (not at all typical) to 7 (very typical). Typicality was defined as ''how representative of the category the instance is or, in other words, how good an example of the category it is.''
Results and Discussion
Participants' own ratings of similarity were used to determine which argument included the more similar categories in each pair of arguments. When similarity judgments from both arguments were the same, arguments were classified according to the experimenters' original similarity classification. Eliminating such cases or conditioning entirely on the experimenters' original classification would not affect the following pattern of results. Moreover, a similar pattern of results obtains if choice proportion is conditionalized on participants' typicality judgments rather than their similarity judgments.
The mean percentages of arguments chosen as stronger whose categories were more similar are shown in Table 1 for both inclusion similarity and premise specificity in the rows labeled ''All arguments''. The more similar argument was chosen in the vast majority of cases (82% in inclusion similarity and 91% in premise specificity). Both of these percentages were significantly greater than chance or 50%, t(72) ϭ 18.69; SE ϭ 4.4% and t(72) ϭ 33.09; SE ϭ 2.8%, respectively by participants, and t(8) ϭ 6.97; SE ϭ 4.5%, t(8) ϭ 15.61; SE ϭ 2.6%, respectively by argument pairs (all p's Ͻ .0001).
Also, percentages in each of the three domains taken separately were all significantly greater than 50% (p Ͻ .0001 in every comparison across participants). In all three domains, most participants chose the arguments with the more similar categories. Inspection of Table 1 reveals that the effect of similarity for the three argument pairs used in each condition was more pronounced for social kinds than for natural kinds and artifacts.
EXPERIMENT 1b
Feedback from participants in Experiment 1a suggested that they did not always treat predicates as blank. For example, the predicate ''are exempt from import taxes'' when applied to ''electronics'' may have been relevant to participants' reasoning because it was explainable (Sloman & Wisniewski, 1992) . Some participants assumed that electronics were exempt from import taxes due to a trade deal with Japan. The availability of such an explanation could have affected the results of Experiment 1a by reducing the tendency to rely on category similarity (by offering an alternative mode of processing) or by changing the similarity measure (by making features of the category differentially salient).
Experiment 1b attempted to remedy this problem by filtering out the nonblank predicates. To do so, I operationalized blankness in terms of the amount of uncertainty a predicate reduced. I asked a group of people to judge the likelihood that each statement of each argument was true. I accepted as blank any predicate from a statement whose mean judged likelihood deviated less than a small amount (one standard deviation) from 5, the scale's midpoint. This operational definition of blankness follows from my earlier claim that a blank predicate is one that is nonexplainable. If a predicate's relation to a category could not be explained, then presumably people had no idea whether or not it applied to the category in question. Hence, they would be likely to give likelihood estimates that reflected maximal uncertainty.
Method
Each statement from each argument was displayed on a computer screen and participants were asked to rate the likelihood that the statement was true. They typed an integer between 0 (very unlikely) and 10 (very likely). They were given three example statements whose probabilities (low, medium, and high) were discussed. Each participant rated 350 statements in random order and each statement was rated by 10 participants who were all Brown University undergraduates.
Results and Discussion
The argument pairs tested in Experiment 1a were eliminated from analysis if any of their component statements had a mean judged likelihood that differed by more than one standard deviation from 5. This criterion eliminated 1 of the 3 pairs from each domain of inclusion similarity and 1 pair from the artifacts domain of premise specificity. Table 1 displays the mean percentages of more similar arguments chosen after eliminating these ''nonblank'' predicates for all domains and both phenomena.
Conditionalizing on pairs with blank predicates had only one noteworthy effect: The mean percentage for artifacts in inclusion similarity went down from 81% to 73%. I have no explanation for this and attribute it to the small number of arguments tested in that condition. Percentage judgments remained greater than 50% overall by participants, t(72) ϭ 12.75; SE ϭ 6.1, for inclusion similarity and t(72) ϭ 29.73; SE ϭ 3.1, for premise specificity (both p's Ͻ .0001) and by argument pairs, t(5) ϭ 4.62; SE ϭ 6.1 and t(7) ϭ 13.74; SE ϭ 3.0, respectively. Again, percentages in each of the three domains taken separately were all significantly greater than 50% ( p Ͻ .0001 in all cases). The effect was slightly larger for argument pairs involving social kinds than for those involving natural kinds and artifacts.
The results of conditionalizing on arguments involving blank predicates serve to reinforce Experiment la's conclusion that, even for arguments in which the premise guarantees the conclusion (assuming the required categorical relations hold), argument strength is proportional to categories' similarity in all three domains.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 1 showed that similarity influences strength judgments in a choice task. But this does not imply neglect of inclusion relations. Participants who wanted to be compliant chose between pairs of arguments. The results might reflect only this compliance. Participants may have considered both arguments perfectly strong but chose on the basis of similarity because they were forced to make a choice. Evidence against this proposal is that participants did not find these choices troublesome. They did not complain that they were being forced to make a difficult decision despite our encouragement to ask the experimenter any questions at any time. Nevertheless, subsequent experiments test this explanation directly by attempting to replicate the phenomena without asking participants to choose between arguments. Instead, participants rated the probability of each conclusion given its premise. If they took full account of the premise category's inclusion of the conclusion category, their ratings of the probability of each critical conclusion should be 1. In this sense, they were given the opportunity to rate both arguments as maximally strong. Any departure from judgments of 1 suggests less than full awareness or use of the inclusion relation. I infer the inclusion similarity or premise specificity phenomena whenever judgements are higher for arguments with more similar premise and conclusion categories.
Another interpretation of participants' willingness in Experiment 1 to choose between arguments involving a categorical inclusion relation is that they did not believe an inclusion relation obtained. The possibility exists (however unlikely) that participants wouldn't have agreed that, for example, trees are plants. This interpretation is also tested in the remaining studies. I obtained participants' own judgments of class inclusion (e.g., Are trees plants?) and conditionalized probability judgments on their assertions that the conclusion category was included in the premise category. If the predictions above hold even after such conditionalization, then the results cannot be due to a paucity of categorical beliefs.
A third possible reason that participants were willing to choose between arguments in Experiment 1 is that they did not interpret the quantification of the statements as universal. When told that ''bodies of water have a high number of seiches,'' they may have understood that only some, and not all, bodies of water have a high number of seiches. After all, if I tell you that ''bunny rabbits are cute,'' you obviously don't infer that I mean all bunnies. Surely I don't mean diseased or severely injured bunnies. If participants did not infer that the predicate applied to all instances of the category, they would have no reason to conclude with certainty that, for example, lakes have a high number of seiches because lakes may be a type of body of water that happens not to have them. To eliminate this possibility in Experiment 2, I told participants explicitly that quantification was universal. Specifically, I prefaced each premise and conclusion category with the word ''all.' ' The prediction was that the judged conditional probability of conclusions would be less than 1 and that more similar arguments would get higher estimates than less similar ones. As in Experiment 1, the arguments to be judged were distributed amongst other, weaker ones. My claim is that people will frequently fail to use an inclusion relation when the relation and its applicability are not transparent, not that people are unable to apply an inclusion relation. Asking people to evaluate a long list composed solely of inclusion arguments would likely constitute such a transparent context.
Method
Design and Materials
The arguments were similar to those used in Experiment 1a. The four predicates rejected in Experiment 1b were replaced by predicates from other arguments that had been deemed blank, and that were different from those previously used to test inclusion similarity and premise specificity. The word ''All'' was inserted before each category in each statement. Here's an example of what participants saw:
All bodies of water have a high number of seiches. Concl: All lakes have a high number of seiches.
The arguments were divided into 9 groups of 16 arguments each. Each group contained two inclusion similarity and two premise specificity arguments in random positions for a total of 36 critical arguments. Each group appeared an equal number of times in each serial position in the complete list of 144 arguments. All inclusion arguments used are presented in the Appendix. All of the other arguments were noticeably weaker.
The design was the same as Experiment 1a; only the dependent variable differed. Three variables were manipulated factorially within-subjects: Phenomenon (inclusion similarity versus premise specificity), Similarity (High versus Low), and Domain (natural kinds, artifacts, social kinds).
Subjects and Procedure
Eighteen Brown University undergraduates were paid for their participation and tested under the same conditions as Experiment 1. Each participant filled out five questionnaires at their own pace in the following order: conditional probability judgments, category inclusion judgments, similarity ratings, shared feature, knowledge, and typicality judgments:
Conditional probability. Participants were asked to rate the probability that the conclusion was true, given that the facts were true. They were entreated to assume the facts were indeed true and told that ratings could range between 0 (definitely false) and 1 (definitely true). Two example arguments, one weak and one strong, were provided and discussed.
Category inclusion. Participants were asked directly whether the subordinate category from each of the 36 arguments was an instance of the corresponding superordinate (e.g., ''Are lakes bodies of water?''). They could circle either ''yes'' or ''no.'' To reduce response bias, another 36 queries about false pairs were randomly interspersed among the true ones. The false pairs were constructed by randomly re-pairing the true query categories (e.g., ''Are lakes carpentry tools?'').
Similarity ratings. Participants rated the similarity of categories from each pair of arguments on a scale from 1 (not at all similar) to 7 (extremely similar).
Shared features. For each pair of critical category pairs (e.g., flowers and plants versus mosses and plants), participants chose the pair that shared more features. The notion of ''feature'' was explained to them and they were asked to ''circle the pair which you think shares more features.'' An example was discussed.
Typicality ratings. Typicality judgments were collected for the 9 pairs used to test inclusion similarity.
2 Participants circled the subordinate (conclusion) category that was more representative or typical of the superordinate or else they circled ''same'' to indicate their typicalities were equal. For example, for Body of water, they were asked to circle one of (Lake, Reservoir, Same).
Results
Participants affirmed that the subordinate (conclusion) category was included in the corresponding superordinate (premise) category 92% of the time. All of the results below are conditionalized on these affirmations. Not a single participant gave a conditional probability judgment of 1 for every argument. Moreover, none of the results below are carried by only a small number of items: Not a single argument (out of 36) received a judgment of 1 from every participant. Mean conditional probability judgments are shown Note. All means are conditional on participants affirming the inclusion relation.
in Table 2 for arguments judged more and less similar for all domains and for both phenomena. The mean inclusion similarity judgment was only 0.89 and the mean premise specificity judgment only 0.86. Both means are significantly less than 1 by both participants, t (17) Means are also all significantly below 1 within the three domains separately. Thus, Brown University students do not always give maximal probability judgments even when they have agreed that the premise category includes the conclusion category despite universal quantification in the arguments.
For each argument pair, I refer to the argument judged to have more shared features as more similar and the other less similar. The results would be substantially the same if similarity judgments were used as the measure of similarity instead because the two measures agree on over 90% of their assignments. I used shared feature judgments because the task prevented ties. A repeated-measures analysis of variance across participants indicates a large effect of similarity, F(1, 17) ϭ 18.90; MSe ϭ 0.021; p Ͻ .001, as does an analysis across argument pairs, F(1, 16) ϭ 12.64; MSe ϭ .0040; p Ͻ .001. The effect of similarity was reliable across phenomena but significant only for the artifacts and social kinds comparisons for premise specificity, t(17) ϭ 3.20; p Ͻ .01 and t(17) ϭ 2.50; p Ͻ .05, respectively, and for natural kinds in inclusion similarity, t(17) ϭ 2.51; p Ͻ .05. The artifacts, t(17) ϭ 1.74; p ϭ .10, and social kinds conditions, t(17) ϭ 2.06; p ϭ .06, of inclusion similarity were only marginally significant. The effect of similarity was clearly reliable overall and does not obviously favor one domain of inference or one of the two phenomena. The effect of Phenomenon was not significant in this experiment by participants, F(1, 17) F(1, 16 ) Ͻ 1. The interaction was also not significant, F Ͻ 1 by both participants and arguments. The results were comparable when similarity was deemed to be varied experimentally by sorting judgments according to experimenters' original similarity assessments.
Discussion
People's failure to use inclusion relations to make probabilistic inferences was observed in three domains with a variety of arguments, as evidenced by conditional probability judgments reliably less than 1. The data also reinforce the conclusion from Experiment 1 that similarity predicts perceived argument strength, even when people are not forced to choose between arguments. The similarity effect eliminates the possibility that responses were reliably lower than 1 merely because of noisy responding. The large and robust similarity effect shows that judgments were made systematically.
These results were obtained using universally quantified arguments whose categories' inclusion relations had been affirmed. This suggests that inclusion similarity and premise specificity are not due to lack of belief in the inclusion relation. Instead, either the inclusion relation was temporarily inaccessible to participants at the time of inference or they may have failed to see, or denied, its relevance.
EXPERIMENT 3
Experiment 3 addresses five alternative explanations for the phenomena left open by Experiment 2. First, superordinate categories admit of an ambiguity; they can refer to individuals-as intended-or they can refer to kinds (Carlson & Pelletier, 1995) . For example, ''all mammals'' could refer to every individual mammal, or to every kind of mammal as in ''All mammals have a male and a female variety.'' To clarify my intended meaning, ''every individual'' replaced ''all'' in Experiment 3 as in the argument:
Every individual body of water has a high number of seiches. Concl: Every individual lake has a high number of seiches.
Second, judgments may have been systematically below 1 because participants were unwilling to use the entire response scale; they may have refused to use the maximal rating even though they believed that the premise implied the conclusion. Of course, this is not a complete explanation for the results because it fails to account for the effect of similarity. It is also unlikely because participants were indeed willing to respond 1 on occasion, just not every time. Moreover, because every participant produced at least one rating below 1, all participants would have had to display this unwillingness (most participants if we attribute some performance to random error). Nevertheless, Experiment 3 tested this explanation by using additional arguments that did not rely on class inclusion reasoning, and yet were so obviously perfectly strong that I expected them to be given judgments of 1. I chose identity arguments like:
(I) Fact: Every individual peach is a good source of zinc. Concl: Every individual peach is a good source of zinc.
Conditional probability judgments of 1 for such arguments would show that participants are willing to use the entire response scale. Note that identity arguments, like inclusion arguments, use blank predicates. So if the previous results merely reflect a lack of confidence engendered by blank predicates, then the same unwillingness to provide extreme judgments should be observed with identity arguments.
Identity arguments serve another purpose as well. Perhaps participants in Experiment 2 were judging the truth of conclusions without fully accepting the truth of premises. If they maintained some residual doubt in premises, they would have no reason to respond with certainty in conclusions. Because premises in identity arguments are of the same type as premises in inclusion arguments, this hypothesis would predict judgments of less than 1 for identity arguments too.
Fourth, Experiment 2 had participants affirm inclusion relations by asking them whether a conclusion category is a subclass of its premise category (e.g., ''Are lakes bodies of water?''). But participants may not have interpreted this question universally; they may have understood it to ask whether some rather than all lakes are bodies of water. If so, then premises would not entail conclusions. To clarify, I prefaced each conclusion category in Experiment 3 with the word ''all'' (e.g., ''Are all lakes bodies of water?'').
Fifth, participants may have responded affirmatively to inclusion questions despite uncertainty about their truth because they were forced to choose between a ''yes'' or ''no'' response. Therefore, Experiment 3 gives them the opportunity to express partial agreement or uncertainty about inclusion relations by adding a ''maybe'' option to the response set.
Although Experiment 3 is designed to test a number of alternative hypotheses, its predictions remain simple. They are that (i) the inclusion similarity and premise specificity phenomena will arise even when conditional probability judgements are conditionalized on ''yes'' responses to corresponding inclusion questions, and (ii) conclusions to identity arguments will be assigned conditional probability ratings of 1.
Method
Design and Materials
The inclusion arguments were identical to those used in Experiment 2 except that the quantifier ''all'' was replaced by ''every individual'' with accompanying grammatical modifications, as in Argument (H) above. Also, five predicates were replaced to remedy some problems. For example, one of the conclusion statements in Experiment 2 was ''All mimes tend to live in SMSA areas.'' A tendency is not easily predicated of every individual in a group, therefore the statement was replaced by ''Every individual mime is omphaloskeptic.'' The new arguments appear in the Appendix.
Nine identity arguments were added, all with the same form as Argument (I) above. The arguments included 3 natural kinds, 3 artifacts, and 3 social kinds. The arguments were divided into 3 groups of 47 arguments each for a total of 141 arguments. Each group contained 6 inclusion similarity, 6 premise specificity, and 3 identity arguments in random positions. The 32 filler arguments in each group consisted of 8 that used the quantifier ''every'', 8 that used ''most'', 8 that used ''some'', and 8 with no category quantifier. Again, none were obviously strong. Each group appeared in each serial presentation position an equal number of times. In other respects the design was identical to Experiment 2.
Subjects and Procedure
Twenty-seven Brown University undergraduates were paid for their participation and tested under the same conditions as previous experiments. Each participant filled out three questionnaires at their own pace in the following order: conditional probability judgments, category inclusion judgments, and similarity ratings. In previous experiments, similarity, shared feature, and typicality judgments had proven redundant for our purposes. Therefore, the similarity procedure was adjusted to eliminate ties and the other tasks were dropped.
Conditional probability. The procedure was identical to Experiment 2 although the instructions were more elaborate. The following sentence was added in boldface: ''Remember that a probability of 0 means that the statement is definitely false (without a shadow of a doubt) whereas a probability of 1 means that it is definitely true.'' Also, definitions were given for the various quantifiers. Most relevant here, ''every individual'' was defined as ''every single individual in the category with no exceptions.'' Category inclusion. For each of the 36 inclusion pairs, participants were asked whether all members of the subordinate category were instances of the superordinate category. They could circle ''yes'', ''no'', or ''maybe.'' As before, 36 queries about false pairs were randomly interspersed among the true ones.
Similarity ratings. Participants were shown two pairs of categories, the first pair from one argument and the other pair from its counterpart. They circled the pair that they considered more similar. An example was provided, followed by the 18 pairs of category pairs from the inclusion arguments.
Results
All of the results reported below are conditionalized on participants responding ''yes'' to the category inclusion question, which they did on 77% of occasions. Again, not a single participant gave a conditional probability judgment of 1 for every argument. Only 1 out of 36 arguments received a judgment of 1 from every participant. Mean probability judgments are shown in Table 3 for arguments judged more and less similar for all domains and for both phenomena. The mean inclusion similarity judgment was only 0.89 and the mean premise specificity judgment 0.93. Both means are significantly less than 1 by both participants, t (26) tively. Means are also all significantly below 1 within the three domains separately. Thus, students did not give maximal judgments even when premises clearly stated that every individual member of the category had the property and they agreed that all members of the conclusion category were members of the premise category. They responded this way despite the opportunity to express uncertainty about the relation between premise and conclusion categories.
A repeated-measures analysis of variance across participants indicated a large effect of similarity, F(1, 26) ϭ 18.05; MSe ϭ 0.025; p Ͻ .001 as did the analysis across argument pairs, F(1, 16) ϭ 5.73; MSe ϭ .0042; p Ͻ .05. The effect of similarity was not significant for each domain within each phenomenon. For inclusion similarity, it was significant for artifacts, t(25) ϭ 2.41; p Ͻ .05, and social kinds, t(25) ϭ 3.99; p Ͻ .001. For premise specificity, it was significant only for artifacts, t(25) ϭ 2.56; p Ͻ .01. For the 3 remaining comparisons, t Ͻ 1. The effect of Phenomenon was significant in this experiment by participants, F(1, 26) ϭ 10.64; MSe ϭ 0.013; p Ͻ .01, but not items, F(1, 16) ϭ 1.81; MSe ϭ .012; n.s. The interaction was not significant, F(1, 26) ϭ 2.41; Mse ϭ .015; n.s. by participants and F(1, 16) Ͻ 1 by items. Participants' similarity judgments agreed with experimenters' on 88% of occasions. Therefore, treating similarity as experimentally manipulated would not have a large effect on the results.
Identity Judgments
The probabilities assigned to the identity arguments were almost all 1: 235 judgments of 1, 6 of .9, one judgment of .2, and one of 0. The mean was .99.
The claim that people neglect inclusion relations predicts that conditional probability judgments for the inclusion arguments should be significantly lower than for identity judgments. As predicted, inclusion similarity judgments were less than identity judgments by both participants, t(26) ϭ 6.31; p Ͻ .0001, and items, t(25) ϭ 2.77; p ϭ .01, and premise specificity were less than identity judgments by participants, t(26) ϭ 4.79; p ϭ .0001, and marginally by items, t(25) ϭ 1.98; p ϭ .06.
Discussion
The inclusion similarity and premise specificity phenomena were replicated. Like Experiment 2, the effect of similarity was reliable overall but did not show up in every condition. Experiment 3 eliminated 5 alternative explanations as complete accounts of the phenomena: (i) They cannot be due to participants' failure to understand that premises applied to all individual category members because premise categories were quantified using ''every individual''; (ii) they cannot be due to participants' unwillingness to use extreme values on the response scale because they did use extreme values when faced with identity arguments; (iii) They cannot be due to uncertainty in the premises because identity arguments contained premises of equal credibility and yet participants rated their conclusions as certain; (iv) They cannot be due to participants failing to believe that all members of the conclusion category were instances of the premise category because responses were conditionalized on affirmation of just that relation; and finally (v) They cannot be due to residual uncertainty in the inclusion relation because participants were given the opportunity to express that uncertainty with a ''maybe'' option to answer the inclusion question.
EXPERIMENT 4
My hypothesis is that inclusion relations are not always accessed when people are reasoning. One prediction of this claim is that inclusion relations should be used more often when they are more accessible. Such a finding would suggest that people are willing and able to employ class inclusion logic; they just don't always do it. To make inclusion relations more accessible, I added them as premises to the arguments. For example, I added the premise ''All lakes are bodies of water'' to Argument (G) to obtain:
All lakes are bodies of water. Fact:
Along with testing the accessibility hypothesis, this manipulation allows an examination of participants' understanding of the conditional probability rating task. First, it provides another test of people's willingness to use the entire response range. If people responded with values less than 1 in earlier experiments merely because they preferred not to use an extreme scale value, then they should do the same here. Second, one effect of adding the premise is to make the argument deductively valid (cf. Cherniak, 1984) . Earlier inclusion arguments, like (G), are not deductively valid in that the premise does not, by itself, render the conclusion certain. The conclusion follows only if the relevant inclusion relation is treated as a hidden premise. In Argument (J), the premises alone guarantee the conclusion. If participants are treating our task as intended, they will ascribe a conditional probability of 1 to conclusions that are certain. Such ratings would provide evidence that participants agree that the conclusion of a valid deductive argument should get a maximal conditional probability rating.
Method
The method of Experiment 4 was identical to that of Experiment 3 except that: (i) All arguments used to test the inclusion similarity and premise specificity phenomena had an additional premise; namely, a premise specifying the relevant inclusion relation as in Argument (J) above; (ii) Identity arguments were changed in a way irrelevant to current purposes (their premises were replaced by conditional statements); (iii) A different group of 27 Brown University undergraduates were tested.
Results
As in previous experiments, all of the results below are conditionalized on participants' affirmation of inclusion relations (67% were affirmed). In short, the inclusion similarity and premise specificity phenomena disappeared. Twenty-three of 27 participants' responses to inclusion arguments were all 1. One participant gave all .9s. Omitting this individual, 32 out of 36 arguments received only judgments of 1. The mean judgment was .99.
Discussion
Making inclusion relations explicit in arguments caused people to rate conclusions as certain. Making relations explicit has the consequence of making them more accessible, hence this result is consistent with the hypothesis that inclusion relations are not always used because they are not always accessed during reasoning.
A second logical possibility is that people judged conclusions certain in this experiment and not in previous ones because inclusion relations were only consistently deemed relevant when included as premises. In earlier experiments, participants may not have believed the critical inclusion relations applied, despite affirming them. This account of neglect presumes that the relevance of a belief about a simple class inclusion relation was not apparent.
Experiment 4 also provides evidence that participants understood the probability rating task in the same way as experimenters. As they did with identity judgments in Experiment 3, they demonstrated a willingness to use extreme values on the response scale. Furthermore, those extreme ratings were given, appropriately, to conclusions of deductively-valid arguments. Note. All means are conditional on participants affirming the inclusion relation.
EXPERIMENT 5
Experiment 4 showed that the inclusion similarity and premise specificity phenomena disappear when inclusion relations are made more accessible. Was this because the relations were more accessible in memory, or because their relevance to reasoning was made explicit by including them as premises in the arguments? In other words, must both the inclusion relation and its relevance be made explicit or would its relevance be apparent once the inclusion relation itself were made more available? To provide a preliminary answer to this question, I increased the prominence of inclusion relations by asking participants about them before they made their probability judgments. Immediately prior to the probability questionnaire, participants made inclusion judgments like those in Experiment 2 (e.g., is a lake a body of water?).
Method
Experiment 5 was identical to Experiment 2 in all respects except that the order of the first two questionnaires was interchanged, category inclusion judgments were made prior to probability judgments (and hence all other judgments as well). Also, a different group of 18 Brown University students was tested.
Results
The results below are again conditionalized on participants' affirmation that the conclusion category is an instance of the premise category (89% of judgments). Once again no participants gave a conditional probability judgment of 1 for every critical argument. Only 1 of the 36 arguments received a judgment of 1 from every participant. Mean conditional probability judgments are shown in Table 4 . The mean inclusion similarity judgment was 0.93 and the mean premise specificity judgment was 0.91. Both means are significantly less than 1 across participants, t(17) ϭ 4.59; SE ϭ .016 and t(17) ϭ 5.21; SE ϭ .017, respectively, and across arguments, t(17) ϭ 4.38; SE ϭ 0.019 and t(17) ϭ 4.93; SE ϭ 0.018, respectively (all p's Ͻ .001). Means are also all significantly below 1 across participants within each domain separately. Having participants make the inclusion judgments first did increase probability judgments, Experiment 5's mean judgment was 0.92 whereas Experiment 2's was only 0.87. However, the difference between the experiments was not close to significant by participants, t(34) ϭ 1.14; SE ϭ .045; n.s., although it was significantly different by arguments, t(35) ϭ 3.81; SE ϭ 0.012; p Ͻ 0001.
As in Experiment 2, the argument in each pair judged to have more shared features was classified as ''more similar'' and the other ''less similar.'' A repeated-measures analysis of variance across participants again shows an effect of similarity, F(1, 17) ϭ 9.33; MSe ϭ 0.017; p Ͻ .01, as did the analysis across argument pairs, F1(1, 16) ϭ 11.42; MSe ϭ .0031; p Ͻ .01. The effect was relatively small. Differences were not significant for any individual comparison except artifacts and social kinds in premise specificity, t(17) ϭ 2.77; SE ϭ .047; p ϭ .01 and t(17) ϭ 2.82; SE ϭ .039; p ϭ .01, respectively. The same two comparisons showed the largest effects of similarity in Experiment 2 as well.
The effect of phenomenon was significant by participants, F(1, 17) ϭ 6.87: MSe ϭ 0.0021; p Ͻ .05, because inclusion similarity judgments were slightly higher than premise specificity ones, but not by items, F(1, 16) Ͻ 1. The interaction between similarity and phenomenon was also significant across participants, F(1, 17) ϭ 6.51; MSe ϭ 0.0058; p Ͻ .05, because the effect of similarity was larger in premise specificity than inclusion similarity, but not across items, F(1, 16) ϭ 1.02; MSe ϭ .0031; n.s.
Discussion
As they did in Experiments 2 and 3, the inclusion similarity and premise specificity phonemena obtained. Conditional probability judgments were significantly below 1 and they were higher when premise and conclusion categories were similar than when they were dissimilar, despite increasing the accessibility of inclusion relations by having them judged before arguments. Reversing the order of the inclusion and probability judgment tasks slightly reduced the incidence of the fallacies, but this effect was not significant across participants. These results provide some evidence that increasing the availability in memory of inclusion relations is not sufficient to cause people to always take them into account; their relevance must also be made transparent.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Summary and Conclusions
I have demonstrated the inclusion similarity and premise specificity phenomena under a variety of conditions. Categorical inclusion relations are often neglected during reasoning, even in a categorical reasoning task where their relevance and application appears to be transparent. Furthermore, similarity relations play a role in reasoning even when logic says they should be dominated by categorical ones.
All the experiments used blank predicates and arguments in which the premise category included the conclusion one. Experiment 1 found that people reliably chose the stronger of two arguments to be the one in which the premise and conclusion categories were more similar. Experiment 2 found the phenomena using conditional probability judgments even though statements were universally quantified and performance was conditionalized on participants' affirmation that the conclusion category was a subclass of the premise category. Experiment 3 showed the same effects even though ambiguity was eliminated by quantifying statements with ''every individual'' and a stricter criterion was used to determine whether inclusion relations were affirmed. Probability judgments were only considered if the participant had said ''yes'' (and not ''maybe''), all members of the conclusion category are also members of the premise category. Experiment 3 also showed that participants were willing to give probability judgments of 1 to identity arguments. Experiment 4 found that participants also gave maximal judgments to inclusion arguments in which the relevant inclusion relation was made explicit as a premise. Finally, Experiment 5 found the phenomena despite increasing the availability of inclusion relations by asking participants about them prior to collecting judgments on the arguments.
I take these data as evidence that people neglect inclusion relations in reasoning about everyday categories in favor of similarity relations. The experiments rule out a number of alternative explanations. The phenomena cannot be attributed to an unwillingness to use extreme scale values because such willingness was demonstrated with the identity arguments in Experiment 3 and with the explicit inclusion arguments in Experiment 4. Moreover, many participants did respond to many arguments with values of 1 and yet failed to respond to all arguments containing an (acknowledged) inclusion relation this way. Finally, this response bias explanation provides no account of the effect of similarity. For the same reasons, the phenomena cannot be attributed to a misunderstanding of how to respond to a deductively valid argument.
These observations bear directly on what our participants understood when they were asked to make ratings of probability. Drawing conclusions about how people reason is difficult if they do not understand the question asked. Participants must have understood the basic properties of the response scale, not only because the instructions explained what various scale values meant, but also because their responses mostly made sense. They gave maximal judgments to the identity and explicit inclusion arguments, their responses to the inclusion similarity and premise specificity arguments were highthough not maximal, and they gave higher judgments to arguments with more similar categories than ones with less similar categories. In general, more similar categories lend more inferential support to one another than less similar categories do. The probability ratings were also consistent with choice data from Experiment 1, Osherson et al. (1990) , and Sloman (1993) and convincingness ratings from Sloman (1993) . Of course, people did not understand the probability task in the same sense that an ideal probability theorist would. One of my purposes is to demonstrate a fallacy in categorical reasoning, and an ideal interpreter would not commit any fallacies. But understanding how people interpret the language of probability is fundamentally the same problem as understanding how they reason about probability. I have shown that people understood the probability questions to concern their uncertainty about the conclusion statements in light of the premises, and that greater certainty should be represented with higher scale values, and complete certainty with 1. That they did not understand probability in a deeper sense is part of my point.
Can the results be attributed to a failure to understand the arguments themselves? Perhaps participants found the statements incomprehensible because they could not imagine how some of the predicates could possibly hold of all category instances. For example, maybe they could not accept that all electronics could ''exhibit magnetic picofluctuation'' given that the property might depend on an electric current and that some electronics are known to be turned off. Such an account is at best incomplete because it fails to explain: (i) the systematic effect of similarity; (ii) that the neglect of inclusion relations was observed with every single argument, and not just with one or two outlandish ones; (iii) the results using identity arguments, which used statements of the same type as the inclusion ones but received maximal ratings; and (iv) the results of Experiment 4, which used statements identical to the inclusion ones yet arguments received maximal ratings. Moreover, this account requires that participants reject not only conclusions due to their incomprehensibility but premises as well, because they contained identical predicates. A cooperative respondent, trying to satisfy task demands, would presumably do the opposite. Rather than dismissing the experimenter's assurance that the premise is true by doubting it, such a respondent would try to find an interpretation of the premise, and hence of the conclusion, that made sense of it.
Under any view, these data do not demonstrate that people are incapable of correctly applying class inclusion relations when reasoning. On the contrary, Experiment 4 showed that they can. These data do demonstrate that people do not automatically apply such relations, even when their application is trivial. Judgments in all of these experiments were made in the context of many other, weaker arguments that may have discouraged the use of class inclusion reasoning. The phenomena may not arise in the context of a homogeneous list of inclusion arguments. However, the phenomena do not depend on embedding the arguments in a long list. I asked Brown University students in an introductory cognitive science course to evaluate only one argument (e.g., given that all plants contain bryophytes, what is the probability that all mosses contain bryophytes?) given to them in a questionnaire. Instructions described what a probability was and defined probabilities of 0, .5, and 1 before asking participants for their own judgments. Inclusion relations were then queried: e.g., ''As far as you know, are all mosses plants?'' with response options of ''yes,'' ''no,'' and ''maybe.'' Of the 40 students who responded ''yes,'' 28% gave probability judgments less than 1 (the mean was .89). So the phenomena do not only arise when people are lulled into the belief that the arguments are weak, or when they are tired or bored with the procedure.
Limitations
The results could be extended in several ways. The phenomena could well arise using predicates that were clearly meaningful, explainable, and that did contribute to participants' reasoning but whose conclusions were uncertain. For example, people should believe that business school professors are academics and some might assent to the proposition that ''all academics feel that they are underpaid'' and yet consider the probability low that ''all business school professors feel that they are underpaid.'' Also, the phenomena should emerge for arguments that use less abstract categories. Most of the inclusion relations tested were between relatively abstract and intermediate-level categories, with the exception of apples/McIntoshes, flowers/roses, and singers/altos. The results may be limited to reasoning at the abstract level. People may prove more sensitive to inclusion relations holding between more specific categories.
One remaining interpretation of the results is that even when people responded ''yes'' to answer an inclusion question, they may have maintained uncertainty in the inclusion relation. And if they were uncertain about it, then they had no reason to express certainty in conclusions. This interpretation requires the unlikely assumption that people would not choose ''maybe'' to express residual uncertainty, but it does remain a logical possibility. This view is not at complete odds with the one that I am espousing. It too presumes that people do not have strong commitments to class inclusion and must therefore assume that people usually reason in some other way. But it does disqualify the phenomena as fallacies in a strong sense, because it assumes no inconsistency between people's beliefs about inclusion and their probability judgments. Empirically, it asserts that a less coarse response scale for the category inclusion question would reveal residual uncertainty about inclusion relations that would account for all the deviations of the conditional probability judgments from 1. 4 It does not disqualify the phenomena in a weaker sense of fallacy though. If you believe that inclusion relations really do hold under the most reasonable interpretation of the categories in the experimental context, then you should believe that only a maximal response is justified. A related issue concerns whether participants neglected inclusion relations in the sense that they failed to appreciate their relevance at all levels of awareness or, rather, in the sense that they consciously decided to ignore them. They might have made a deliberate judgment that the conditional probability of these conclusions could not be 1, despite their awareness of the line of logic that would dictate that they must be. Experiment 5 provides weak support for this view by showing that making inclusion relations more accessible had only a minimal effect on judgment; participants still often neglected to apply them. Otherwise, the data do not decide between these alternatives. What the data do show is that participants neglected inclusion relations in the sense that they did not consistently apply them to evaluate these simple arguments but relied on a similarity-based heuristic instead.
Domain Specificity
Inclusion relations were reliably neglected in all three empirical domains-natural kinds, artifacts, and social kinds. The effect of similarity was found in each domain although was not reliable within each domain across experiments, least of all for natural kinds. This may reflect that only three pairs of arguments were used to test each phenomenon within each domain. The consistency of judgments with similarity-especially in Experiment 1-and the neglect of inclusion relations in all three domains is consistent with the domain-independent view of categorical inference implicit in the computational models of Osherson et al. (1990) , Osherson et al. (1994), and Sloman (1993) .
The only domain to have a relatively universal class inclusion structure is that of living kinds (Atran, 1990) . Being universal, these class inclusion relations might be anticipated to play a greater role in reasoning than class inclusion relations involving other kinds. Unfortunately, only two of my arguments involve living kinds in Atran's sense. Neither flowers nor fruit qualify, for instance, because their senses are defined by their social functions, not by any scientific discipline. The two qualifying arguments are listed in the Appendix as Inclusion Similarity argument 1b and Premise Specificity premise categories. 58% of these latter category inclusion judgments were 1. Conditionalizing on these strong affirmations of the category inclusion relation, only 2 of 18 people gave a maximal conditional probability judgment for every one of the remaining arguments. The mean was higher than in previous studies, but it was still significantly less than 1, M ϭ .96, t(16) ϭ 3.47, SE ϭ .012, p Ͻ .01 across participants and M ϭ .95, t(35) ϭ 4.45, SE ϭ .011, p Ͻ .001 across items. Thus, this study suggests that participants maintained some residual uncertainty in inclusion relations but not enough to fully account for the phenomena. argument 2b. These arguments were not treated substantially differently than others. The mean conditional probability judgments assigned to them were .79, .92, and .92 in Experiments 2, 3, and 5, respectively.
These experiments are not revealing about the relative inductive potential of categories in the three domains. The inductive potential assigned to a category depends on the predicate being projected (Goodman, 1955; Shipley, 1993) . Although the predicates in these studies were blank in the sense of being nonexplainable, they were all projectible to other categories. Indeed, they were chosen to have that kind of inductive potential.
Explaining the Neglect of Inclusion Relations
The neglect of inclusion relations could have arisen in either of two ways. First, the inclusion relations might have been unavailable to participants at the time of inference because they were occupied doing some other kind of analysis. They may not have noticed them. This possibility seems plausible but insufficient because its fit with the data from Experiment 5 is tenuous. In that study, people were asked about the relevant inclusion relations immediately prior to making their probability judgments; the inclusion relations were presumably available in memory during inference because they had just been evaluated. A second possibility is that the inclusion relations did not always seem relevant. They might not treat chairs as a subset of furniture when reasoning as they don't when naming (Hampton, 1982) , despite affirming the inclusion relations when asked directly. People might take a loose view of category structure even when making property inferences. This is the essence of the view of the inferential process elaborated by my ''feature-based induction'' model of property projection (Sloman, 1993) . That model posits that the strength of a categorical argument is given by the extent to which the features of the premise category (or categories) cover the features of the conclusion category. Roughly, arguments are judged strong to the extent that the conclusion category shares features with the premise categories and has few distinctive features of its own. Because subordinate categories share many features with their superordinates but necessarily have some distinctive features, my feature coverage model predicts that inclusion arguments like those studied here should be judged strong but not perfectly so, and that their strength should be proportional to the similarity of premise and conclusion categories, as observed. The results are anathema to Osherson et al.'s (1990) similarity-coverage model because of its assumption that category coverage, as opposed to feature coverage, is critical. Specifically, that model assumes that arguments are strong to the extent that premise categories cover the space of instances specified by a category that includes the premise and conclusion categories. If the premise includes a superordinate of the conclusion category, then the argument should be judged perfectly strong, a prediction violated by the current data. This is a problem for any psychological model which assumes that concepts are represented in a category hierarchy so that properties can be inferred through inheritance (e.g., Anderson & Bower, 1973; Collins & Michalski, 1989; Collins & Quillian, 1969; Glass & Holyoak, 1975; Shastri & Ajjanagadde, 1993) , an assumption implicit in defining feature models (Smith, Shoben, & Rips, 1974) . The problem is reduced for models that have special facilities to handle exceptions (e.g., Fahlman, 1989; Holland et al., 1986) . However, exceptions tend to be limited to atypical instances. By distinguishing typical and atypical instances, such models are compatible with the similarity effects I have described, but they do not sit so easily with the relatively low conditional probability judgments in the more similar conditions, which use typical instances.
The data clearly rule out models that assume strict class inclusion hierarchies, but they do not distinguish between two other views of the inferential process, what I call the ''inside'' and ''outside'' views following Tversky and Kahneman (1983) . My feature-based model takes an inside view by modeling performance in terms of the internal structure of the representations of premise and conclusion categories. In particular, the model describes a feature comparison process. An alternative, outside view is that people bring instances of the premise and conclusion categories to mind when engaged in property projection. The inclusion similarity and premise specificity phenomena would follow from the assumptions that (i) the likelihood that instances of the category come to mind is proportional to their typicality; (ii) no instance always comes to mind; and (iii) the probability assigned to the conclusion is a function of the typicality in the conclusion category of those instances brought to mind by the premise.
5 A proposal like this is discussed by Cherniak (1984) . The inside and outside views share the assumption that people neglect the extensional relation of class inclusion in favor of typicality.
Implications
Clearly, we are capable of incorporating class inclusion logic into our thought and reasoning. We saw participants do it in Experiment 4. As we see however, it is not always done spontaneously. Sloman (1996) argues for two systems of reasoning, one rule-based and one associative (see Gigerenzer & Regier, 1996 , for a response). Associative reasoning is relatively spontaneous and based on principles of similarity and temporal contiguity. Rule-based reasoning requires more deliberation and is therefore less ubiquitous. But when elicited, it has authority. The data that I have reported in this paper suggest that class inclusion reasoning has the properties that I have ascribed to rule-based reasoning.
If rules are required to represent the systematic and strict relation of inclusion, and if most of everyday reasoning is not rule-following, then class inclusion reasoning is not part of the fabric that causes concepts and everyday inference to (usually) cohere. Undoubtedly it is part of our intellectual competence, but its use is limited to circumstances in which we have sufficient time and expertise to explicitly use rules to derive inferences consistent with probability. Inclusion relations are part of the set of rules that we can apply given the right conditions; not the set of relations that comprise memory structure. A distinct possibility is that competence with class inclusion reasoning is part and parcel of our ability to express rules in language.
Conclusion
Rarely is the neglect of inclusion relations a problem in everyday inference. Categories whose natural organization constitutes an inheritance hierarchy are surprisingly rare. The biological hierarchy provides an obvious exception, but even its structure is under dispute (Gould, 1983) and its exceptions are notorious (e.g., some mammals fly and others live in the ocean). Class distinctions are always possible; arbitrary hierarchies can always be constructed to suit a particular purpose. But those hierarchies are apparently less central to human inference than logic suggests. All carpentry tools are subject to a special tariff. Concl: All hammers are subject to a special tariff. b. Fact:
All carpentry tools are subject to a special tariff. Concl: All awls are subject to a special tariff. All electronic equipment has parts made of germanium. Concl: All stereos have parts made of germanium. 6 a. Fact:
All cutting instruments are widely exported. Concl: All knives are widely exported. Every individual singer has dentiles. Concl: Every individual alto has dentiles.
b. Fact:
Every individual entertainer has dentiles. Concl: Every individual alto has dentiles.
